Lawyers are drawn to the metaphor of law as machinery. It promises a world in which the correct inputs produce the correct result—and in which judgment can be mistaken for inevitability.

But a rule does not select the facts that matter. It does not decide how broadly to describe a precedent, which analogy is most faithful, or whether an exception has swallowed its justification. People do that. Often conscientiously. Never mechanically.

Rules discipline judgment. They do not eliminate it.

This is not an argument against rules. Quite the opposite. A candid account of judgment makes legal reasoning more accountable because it requires the decision-maker to identify the choice, defend it, and accept its consequences.

The best opinions do not announce that the answer was obvious. They show why one answer is better—textually, doctrinally, and institutionally—while treating the rejected argument as something an intelligent person might actually believe.

Filed in Judicial Craft